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D
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
       etention of a foreign warship by a coastal State creates particular strate-
gic and security interest sensitivities for both the flag State of the warship 
and the coastal State. Thus, the determination of whether to release a de-
tained foreign warship and its crew is a crucial issue in law and practice. Two 
cases before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the 
2012 ARA Libertad case1 and the 2019 Ukraine v. Russia case,2 provide im-
portant insights into this issue. 
The ARA Libertad case concerned the release of the frigate Libertad, a 
warship of the Argentine Navy, after it was detained by Ghanaian authori-
ties.3 Following discussions between Ghana and Argentina, Ghana author-
ized the visit of the vessel to the port of Tema on June 4, 2020 and formally 
advised Argentina of its decision by an exchange of notes through diplomatic 
channels.4 A formal welcome ceremony was held on board when the Libertad 
arrived in Tema on October 1. The following day, an official of the Judicial 
Service of the Superior Court of Judicature of Ghana (Commercial Division) 
arrived at the vessel and delivered an order issued by that court requiring the 
Libertad to be held at the port of Tema.5 According to Ghana, this “unfortu-
nate incident” resulted from a series of cases brought by NML in the courts 
of the United States and the United Kingdom against Argentina.6 
                                                                                                                      
1. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 
15, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 332. For a commentary on this case, see Yoshifumi Tanaka, Current 
Legal Developments International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: The Ara Libertad Case (Argentina 
v. Ghana, 15 December 2012), Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, 28 INTERNA-
TIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 375 (2013). 
2. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, ITLOS Rep. [hereinafter Ukraine v. Russia Order]. Please note that the anal-
ysis in this article relies on the electronic version of the Tribunal’s Order of May 25, 2019, 
available at the ITLOS website. See INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
CASE NO. 26, https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-26/. 
3. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Request for Provisional Measures Sub-
mitted by Argentina, 2–3, ¶ 3 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Request for Provisional Measures 
Submitted by Argentina]. 
4. Id. ¶ 4. 
5. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
6. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Written Statement of the Republic of 
Ghana, 1–2, ¶ 3 (Nov. 28, 2012). According to Ghana, NML is a company incorporated 
under the laws of the Cayman Islands and a subsidiary of a U.S. company engaged in the 
management of investments. Id. 
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On October 29, 2012, Argentina instituted proceedings against Ghana 
before an arbitral tribunal7 established under Annex VII to the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention).8 On 
November 14, 2012, Argentina also filed with ITLOS a request for the pre-
scription of provisional measures9 pursuant to UNCLOS Article 290(5).10 
Argentina requested the Tribunal to order Ghana to “unconditionally enable 
the Argentine warship Frigate ARA Libertad to leave the Tema port and the 
jurisdictional waters of Ghana and to be resupplied to that end.”11 ITLOS, 
in its December 15 Order, unanimously prescribed the following provisional 
measure: 
 
Ghana shall forthwith and unconditionally release the frigate ARA Liber-
tad, shall ensure that the frigate ARA Libertad, its Commander and crew 
are able to leave the port of Tema and the maritime areas under the juris-
diction of Ghana, and shall ensure that the frigate ARA Libertad is resup-
plied to that end.12 
 
Seven years later, a similar dispute arose between Ukraine and the Rus-
sian Federation. A key issue in the Ukraine v. Russia case concerned the re-
lease of three Ukrainian naval vessels (the Berdyansk, the Nikopol, and the 
Yani Kapu) and their twenty-four crewmen detained by the Russian Federa-
tion. The Berdyansk and the Nikopol are artillery boats, and the Yani Kapu is a 
                                                                                                                      
7. ARA Libertad Arbitration (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 2013-11, Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/65/. The arbitral proceedings were terminated 
pursuant to Article 22(1) of the Rules of Procedure after an agreement was reached between 
Argentina and Ghana. See ARA Libertad Arbitration (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 2013-11, 
PCA Case Repository, Termination Order (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013). 
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VII, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
9. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 338, ¶ 26. According to Argentina, following the in-
stitution of arbitral proceedings, the situation became even more aggravated. It cited the 
Port Authority’s attempt on November 7 to forcibly move the Libertad and the cutting off 
of electricity and water to the ship. Request for Provisional Measures Submitted by Argen-
tina, supra note 3, at 10, ¶ 17, and 6–7, ¶ 30. 
10.  UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 290(5). 
11. Request for Provisional Measures Submitted by Argentina, supra note 3, at 24, ¶ 
72bis; ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 338, ¶ 28. 
12. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 350, ¶ 108. 
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tugboat. In contrast to the Libertad, a tall ship used for the training of naval 
cadets, the Ukrainian vessels were in operational service.13 
On November 25, the three Ukrainian vessels and their crews were ar-
rested and detained by Russian Federation authorities in the Black Sea near 
the Kerch Strait.14 Russian authorities claimed that innocent passage through 
the Russian territorial sea leading to the Kerch Strait was temporarily sus-
pended for foreign military vessels and that the Ukrainian naval vessels at-
tempted to break through what Russia described as a blockade without fol-
lowing the procedures provided in a 2015 regulation.15 
In response, on March 31, 2019, Ukraine instituted the arbitral proceed-
ings in respect of a “dispute concerning the immunity of three Ukrainian 
naval vessels and the twenty-four servicemen on board.”16 On April 16, 
2019, Ukraine further asked ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures re-
quiring the Russian Federation to promptly: 
 
a. Release the Ukrainian naval vessels the Berdyansk, the Nikopol, and the 
Yani Kapu, and return them to the custody of Ukraine; 
 
b. Suspend criminal proceedings against the twenty-four detained Ukrain-
ian servicemen and refrain from initiating new proceedings; and 
 
c. Release the twenty-four detained Ukrainian servicemen and allow them 
to return to Ukraine.17 
 
                                                                                                                      
13. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Verbatim 
Record, ITLOS/PV.19/C26/1/Rev.1, at 28 (May 10, 2019). 
14. According to Ukraine, the Berdyansk and the Yani Kapu were seized at a distance of 
approximately twelve nautical miles from the coast and the Nikopol at a distance of approx-
imately twenty nautical miles from the coast. Id. at 6. 
15. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Memo-
randum of the Government of the Russian Federation, 6–7, ¶¶ 14, 17 (May 7, 2019) [here-
inafter Russian Memorandum]. The 2015 regulations refer to the Mandatory Regulations 
for the Seaport of Kerch approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 
313 of 21 October 2015. Id. at 4, ¶ 10. 
16. Dispute Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen 
(Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 2019-28, PCA Case Repository, Procedural Order No. 1, pmbl., ¶ 
6 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2019). 
17. Request of Ukraine for the Prescription of Provisional Measures under Article 290, 
Paragraph 5, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Detention of Three 
Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26 Written Pleadings, ¶ 22 (Apr. 16, 2019); 
Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 24. 
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While the Russian Federation chose not to appear before ITLOS,18  the 
Tribunal, in its May 25 Order, prescribed the following provisional measures: 
 
The Russian Federation shall immediately release the Ukrainian naval ves-
sels Berdyansk, Nikopol and Yani Kapu, and return them to the custody of 
Ukraine; 
 
The Russian Federation shall immediately release the 24 detained Ukrainian 
servicemen and allow them to return to Ukraine; 
 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall refrain from taking any action 
which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal. 19 
 
Thus, in both the ARA Libertad and Ukraine v. Russia cases, ITLOS pre-
scribed provisional measures ordering the release of detained warships and 
the crewmembers. In this connection, three issues must be examined. 
The first is the interpretation of military activities set out in UNCLOS 
Article 298(1)(b). This provision allows parties to the Convention to exempt 
“disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by gov-
ernment vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and dis-
putes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sov-
ereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tri-
bunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3.”20 This raises the question of 
whether the detention of a foreign warship and its crew would fall within the 
scope of “military activities.” This question was the most contentious issue 
in the Ukraine v. Russia case. 
The second issue relates to the immunity of the ships involved in the two 
cases. In that regard, the Convention provides immunities to two types of 
ships. The first are warships, which are defined in UNCLOS Article 29.21 
Article 95 sets forth the second type, which are “[s]hips owned or operated 
by a State and used only on government non-commercial service.”22 On the 
                                                                                                                      
18. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 8. However, the Russian Federation sub-
mitted a memorandum in support of its position that ITLOS lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. See Russian Memorandum, supra note 15, at 2, ¶ 2. 
19. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 124. 
20. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 298(1)(b). 
21. Id. art. 22. 
22. Id. art. 95. 
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high seas, ships falling under Article 29 or Article 95 enjoy “complete im-
munity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.”23 As the 
text of Articles 95 and 96 make clear, these ships enjoy immunity when they 
are on the high seas. Part II of the Convention concerns the territorial seas 
and the contiguous zone. Here, Article 32 provides that “[w]ith such excep-
tions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in 
this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government 
ships operated for non-commercial purposes.”24 These UNCOS articles re-
quire an examination of the question of whether the detained vessels fall 
within the scope of warships under Article 29 or governmental ships under 
Articles 96 and 32. In this connection, the applicability of Article 32 to in-
ternal waters must also be addressed. 
The third issue pertains to the urgency of the situation and the ordering 
of provisional measures. The objective of provisional measures is the preser-
vation of the respective rights of the disputing parties pending the final de-
cision of a court and the court’s ability to effectively exercise its judicial func-
tions.25 If the preservation of rights was not urgent, no action was required 
until a judgment was rendered. Hence, urgency can be thought to be an es-
sential requirement for prescribing provisional measures.26 The issue at point 
is whether or not the release of a detained foreign warship and its crew con-
stitutes an urgency of the situation requiring the prescription of provisional 
measures. 
Focused on the above three issues, this article examines provisional 
measures regarding the release of a detained foreign warship and its crew-
members in the jurisprudence of ITLOS. Part II addresses the interpretation 
of military activities under UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b). Part III examines the 
issue of the immunity of a detained ship under UNCLOS Articles 29, 32, 95, 
and 96. Part IV considers the question of urgency in ordering provisional 
                                                                                                                      
23. Id. arts. 95, 96. 
24. Id. art. 32. 
25. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning 
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 
537, ¶ 33 (July 18); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Provisional Measures, Order, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 169, ¶ 32 (May 10); see also ROBERT 
KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 616 (2013). 
26. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), Case No. 3 and 4, 
Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, ITLOS Rep. 280, 316, ¶ 2 (separate opinion 
by Treves, J.); see also Tullio Treves, Article 290, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 1866 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017). 
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measures concerning the release of a detained ship and its crew, before of-
fering conclusions in Part V. 
 
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES UNDER UNCLOS 
ARTICLE 298(1)(B) 
 
A. Distinction between Military and Law Enforcement Activities 
 
This Part examines the interpretation of the military activities exception to 
compulsory dispute settlement under UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b). This was 
the subject of extensive debate in the Ukraine v. Russia case.27 
When ratifying the Convention, both Ukraine and the Russian Federa-
tion declared they did not accept the compulsory procedures of international 
dispute settlement pursuant to Article 298(1)(b) for disputes concerning mil-
itary activities.28 In this case, the issue that arose was whether the arrest and 
detention of the three Ukrainian naval vessels and their crews by Russian 
Federation authorities were military activities or law enforcement activities. 
Referring to the dictum of the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award, the 
Russian Federation maintained, “[i]t is manifestly a dispute concerning mili-
tary activities.”29 Ukraine countered that “Russia’s invocation of the military 
activities exception is misplaced.”30 Thus, ITLOS had to decide whether the 
military activities exception set out in Article 298(1)(b) was properly in-
voked.31 This required the Tribunal to examine two issues: first, the relevance 
of the type of vessels, and second, the characterization of the activities in 
question by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. 
 
1. Type of Vessels 
 
The first issue is whether the nature of military activities can be decided 
based on the type of vessels involved. Ukraine argued that “it is not the type 
                                                                                                                      
27. The military activities exception set out in Article 298(1)(b) did not apply to the 
ARA Libertad case because neither Argentina nor Ghana had precluded disputes concerning 
military activities from the Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement procedures. 
28. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶¶ 48–49. 
29. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
30. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Verbatim 
Record, ITLOS/PV.19/C26/1/Rev.1, at 18 (May 10, 2019). 
31. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 63. 
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of vessel, but rather the type of activity the vessel is engaged in, that mat-
ters.”32 ITLOS supported this view, stating: “[T]he distinction between mil-
itary and law enforcement activities cannot be based solely on whether naval 
vessels or law enforcement vessels are employed in the activities in ques-
tion.”33 
In the view of the Tribunal, even though the type of vessels—whether 
naval vessels or law enforcement vessels—may be a relevant factor, “the tra-
ditional distinction between naval vessels and law enforcement vessels in 
terms of their roles has become considerably blurred.”34 Further, the Tribu-
nal noted, “it is not uncommon today for States to employ the two types of 
vessels collaboratively for diverse maritime tasks.”35 In considering the va-
lidity of the Tribunal’s view that the applicability of the military activities 
exception under Article 298(1)(b) cannot be decided by the type of vessels 
alone, three cases merit discussion. 
The first is the 2007 Guyana v. Suriname arbitration. In this case, a ques-
tion arose as to whether there was a threat of force by gunboats from the 
Surinamese navy when it expelled Guyana’s drill ship C.E. Thornton from a 
maritime area claimed by both Suriname and Guyana. Primarily based on the 
testimony of a witness to the incident, the Annex VII arbitral tribunal held 
that “the action mounted by Suriname on 3 June 2000 seemed more akin to 
a threat of military action rather than a mere law enforcement activity.”36 It 
accordingly found that “Suriname’s action therefore constituted a threat of 
the use of force in contravention of the Convention, the UN Charter and 
general international law.”37 In so deciding, the arbitral tribunal seemed to 
focus on “Suriname’s action” rather than the type of a ship. 
The second case is the 2016 South China Sea arbitration. In this case, the 
Philippines requested the Annex VII arbitral tribunal to declare: 
 
                                                                                                                      
32. Id. ¶ 58. 
33. Id. ¶ 64. By contrast, Judge Kolodkin seemingly considered the vessel type as a 
criterion. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order 
of May 25, 2019, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kolodkin, ¶ 9. However, this interpretation 
was not supported by ITLOS. 
34. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 64. 
35. Id. 
36. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary (Guy. v. Surin.), 30 R.I.A.A. 1, 126 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2007). 
37. Id. 
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(14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China 
has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other 
things: 
(a) interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, 
and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal; 
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed 
at Second Thomas Shoal; 
(c) endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed 
at Second Thomas Shoal; and 
(d) conducting dredging, artificial island-building and construction activi-
ties at Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, John-
son Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef.38 
 
Paragraphs (a)–(c) concerned China’s interactions with units of the Philip-
pines armed forces at Second Thomas Shoal.39 In 2006, China had declared 
that it “does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of 
Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.”40 
An issue thus arose as to whether this dispute concerned military activities 
for the purposes of Article 298(1)(b).41 
On this issue, the Annex VII arbitral tribunal concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ Submission No 14(a), (b), and (c).42 
The tribunal’s reasoning was summarized in the following statement: 
 
[T]he essential facts at Second Thomas Shoal concern the deployment of a 
detachment of the Philippines’ armed forces that is engaged in a stand-off 
with a combination of ships from China’s Navy and from China’s Coast 
Guard and other government agencies. In connection with this standoff, 
Chinese Government vessels have attempted to prevent the resupply and 
rotation of the Philippine troops on at least two occasions. Although, as 
far as the Tribunal is aware, these vessels were not military vessels, China’s 
                                                                                                                      
38. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013–19, PCA Case Repos-
itory, Award, ¶ 1110 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) (citing Philippines Submission No. 14). The 
Philippines’ submission concerned the obligation of restraint. For an analysis of the South 
China Sea arbitral award on this subject, see YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
ARBITRATION: TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER IN THE OCEANS 151–61 
(2019). 
39. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 38, ¶ 1111. 
40. Id. ¶ 203. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. ¶ 1162. 
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military vessels have been reported to have been in the vicinity. In the Tri-
bunal’s view, this represents a quintessentially military situation, involving 
the military forces of one side and a combination of military and paramili-
tary forces on the other, arrayed in opposition to one another.43 
 
The arbitral tribunal focused on two elements. The first was the conduct 
of the Chinese vessels; the second was the situation in which the incidents 
occurred. Concerning the latter, the arbitral tribunal considered that the ex-
istence of China’s military vessels in the vicinity represented a “quintessen-
tially military situation,” even though the Chinese government vessels that 
attempted to prevent the resupply and rotation of the Philippine troops were 
not military vessels. The tribunal’s dictum suggests that the military nature 
cannot be decided solely on the basis of the type of vessels directly involved 
in an incident. 
The third case is the Ukraine v. Russia arbitration concerning coastal State 
rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait.44 In this case, the 
Russian Federation raised a preliminary objection concerning the military 
activities exception under Article 298(1)(b).45 The Annex VII arbitral tribu-
nal, however, did not consider that “mere involvement or presence of mili-
tary vessels is in and by itself sufficient to trigger the military activities ex-
ception.”46 Further, it found that “the mere involvement of military vessels 
or personnel in an activity does not ipso facto render the activity military in 
nature.”47 
Taken together, the jurisprudence suggests that whether a dispute con-
cerns military activities under Article 298(1)(b) cannot be decided only by 
the type of vessels involved. Rather, as was addressed in the Ukraine v. Russia 
case, the type of vessels involved constitutes only one of the relevant factors. 
 
2. The Characterization of the Activities by the Parties to a Dispute 
 
The second issue concerns the relevance of the characterization of the activ-
ities in question by the parties to a dispute. In the Ukraine v. Russia case, the 
two countries were sharply divided. According to the Russian Federation, 
                                                                                                                      
43. Id. ¶ 1161. 
44. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch 
Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 2017-06, PCA Case Repository, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2020). 
45. Id. ¶ 303–13. 
46. Id. ¶ 334. 
47. Id. ¶ 340. 
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“Ukraine has, in statements made outside the confines of the claim, including 
before the United Nations Security Council and in subsequent formal com-
munications with the Russian Federation, repeatedly characterized the inci-
dent as concerning military activities.”48 In contrast, Ukraine maintained: 
 
Russia has repeatedly and consistently stated that its actions that provide 
the basis for Ukraine’s claims were not military in nature. In particular, 
Russia has maintained that its arrest and detention of the Ukrainian vessels 
and imprisonment and prosecution of the servicemen are solely matters of 
domestic law enforcement.49 
 
Ukraine further stressed “neither the involvement of the Russian Navy in 
the incident nor the use of force alone converts a law enforcement activity 
into a military one.”50 
On this issue, ITLOS took the view that the distinction between military 
and law enforcement activities cannot be based solely on the characterization 
of the activities in question by the parties to a dispute since “such character-
ization may be subjective and at variance with the actual conduct.”51 In fact, 
ITLOS, in its Order of May 25, took little account of the intent of the parties, 
even though the Tribunal accepted that the characterization of the activities 
in question by the parties “may be a relevant factor, especially in case of the 
party invoking the military activities exception.”52 
In this context, the South China Sea arbitration is relevant. When deter-
mining whether Chinese land reclamation activities at seven reefs were mili-
tary in nature, the Annex VII arbitral tribunal took note of “China’s repeated 
statements that its installations and island-building activities are intended to 
fulfill civilian purposes.”53 It thus held that the arbitral tribunal would not 
“deem [Chinese] activities to be military in nature when China itself has con-
sistently and officially resisted such classifications and affirmed the opposite 
at the highest levels.”54 While the context differed from that of the Ukraine 
v. Russia case, in the South China Sea arbitral award, the tribunal seemed to 
give much greater weight to China’s intent. 
                                                                                                                      
48. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 53. 
49. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Verbatim 
Record, ITLOS/PV.19/C26/1/Rev.1, at 20 (May 10, 2019); see also id. at 18. 
50. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 60. 
51. Id. ¶ 65. 
52. Id. 
53. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 38, ¶ 935. 
54. Id. ¶ 938. 
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In light of the limited number of cases on this subject, it is difficult to 
draw any general conclusion regarding the question of whether, and to what 
extent, the characterization of the activities in question by the parties to a 
dispute is relevant. While, as ITLOS stated, the nature of activities concerned 
cannot be decided on the basis of the characterization by the parties alone, 
there may be scope to consider that this element constitutes one of the rele-
vant factors to be taken into account.55 
In sum, ITLOS jurisprudence indicates that neither the type of vessels 
nor the characterization of the activities in question by the parties to a dis-
pute provides a decisive criterion for distinguishing military activities from 
law enforcement activities. As ITLOS, in the Ukraine v. Russia Order, stated, 
“the distinction between military and law enforcement activities must be 
based primarily on an objective evaluation of the nature of the activities in 
question, taking into account the relevant circumstances in each case.”56 Ac-
cordingly, further consideration must be given to those relevant circum-
stances that need to be taken into account in making an objective evaluation 
of the nature of the activities. 
 
B. Three Elements for Evaluating the Nature of the Activities 
 
1. Conduct, Cause, and Context 
 
ITLOS, in its Order of May 25, 2019, evaluated the nature of the activities 
by focusing on three elements: conduct, cause, and context. The Tribunal’s 
view can be summarized as follows. 
First, as regards the conduct of the parties in dispute, ITLOS held that 
“the underlying dispute leading to the arrest concerned the passage of the 
Ukrainian naval vessels through the Kerch Strait.”57 Continuing, the Tribunal 
found, “it is difficult to state in general that the passage of naval ships per se 
amounts to a military activity.”58 Curiously, the Tribunal then also stated, 
                                                                                                                      
55. In this regard, Judge Gao considered that 
[e]valuation of military activities should be based on a combination of factors, such as the 
intent and purpose of the activities, taking into account the relevant circumstances of the 
case, such as the manner in which the Parties deployed their forces and the way in which 
the Parties engaged one another at sea. 
Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of May 25, 
2019, Separate Opinion of Judge Gao, ¶ 22. 
56. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 66. 
57. Id. ¶ 68. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“Under the Convention, passage regimes, such as innocent or transit passage, 
apply to all ships.”59 As this statement was made in the context of the dispute 
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, caution will be needed in in-
terpreting this dictum to mean that the right of innocent passage can apply to 
foreign warships in general. Even so, Judge Jesus clearly stated, “under the 
Convention, States are not required to inform the coastal State or to request 
prior authorization from it when its ships, including warships, plan to make 
use of their right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the coastal 
State.”60 Given that to this date, State practice is sharply divided concerning 
the right of innocent passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea,61 the 
statement of this learned judge is noteworthy. 
Second, when considering the cause of the incident, ITLOS focused on 
two reasons highlighted by the Russian Federation: the failure of the Ukrain-
ian naval vessels to comply with the “relevant procedure in the 2015 Regu-
lations” and the temporary suspension of the right of innocent passage for 
naval vessels.62 In light of this development, the Tribunal took the view that 
“at the core of the dispute was the Parties’ differing interpretation of the 
regime of passage through the Kerch Strait” and that “such a dispute is not 
military in nature.”63 
Third, concerning the context of the incident, it was undisputed that 
force was used by the Russian Federation in the process of the arrest of the 
Ukrainian naval vessels.64 According to the facts provided by the parties, the 
Ukrainian naval vessels sailed away from the Kerch Strait. The Russian Coast 
Guard ordered them to stop and pursued them when the vessels ignored the 
order and continued their navigation. It was in this context that the Russian 
Coast Guard used force.65 The Tribunal thus considered that the use of force 
was a law enforcement operation rather than a military operation and that 
“the arrest and detention of the Ukrainian naval vessels by the Russian Fed-
eration took place in the context of a law enforcement operation.”66 ITLOS 
therefore concluded that prima facie Article 298(1)(b) of the Convention did 
                                                                                                                      
59. Id. 
60. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, ¶ 19. 
61. YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 110–11 (3d ed. 
2019). 
62. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 71. 
63. Id. ¶ 72. 
64. Id. ¶ 73. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. ¶ 75. 
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not apply67 and that prima facie the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would have 
jurisdiction to deal with the dispute.68 
Under the Tribunal’s approach, the nature of the dispute in question is 
to be decided by considering all relevant circumstances, including conduct, 
cause, and context. While this approach has certain merit since it can flexibly 
take relevant circumstances into account on a case-by-case basis, it can be 
questioned as to whether an international court or tribunal can make an ob-
jective evaluation on this matter. Different interpretations may occur, for 
instance, with the characterization of the conduct of the parties in dispute. 
Furthermore, the activities of the parties may be multifaceted. In this regard, 
Judge Kittichaisaree observed, “[c]ertain incidents may comprise a mixture 
of both military and law-enforcement aspects.”69 Thus, further consideration 
must be given to the evaluation of a combination of military and law en-
forcement activities occurring at the same time. 
 
2. Evaluation of the Mixed Activities 
 
Judge Gao, in his separate opinion, discussed the issue of mixed activities in 
some detail. He considered that “the dispute in question has, at least, a mixed 
nature of both military and law enforcement activities or, in other words, it 
is a mixed dispute involving both military and law enforcement elements.”70 
This analysis raises the issue of the proportion between the military element 
and the law enforcement element. On that issue, Judge Gao’s view seemed 
to be that the incident was primarily characterized by military activities.71 
Nonetheless, eventually, Judge Gao accepted the prima facie jurisdiction of 
the Annex VII arbitral tribunal. In the words of the learned judge, “It is 
perhaps this law enforcement element of a mixed dispute that appears to 
equally afford a basis on which the prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal could be found.”72 
According to Judge Gao’s approach, in the case of a mixed dispute, some 
elements of law enforcement may be adequate to characterize the dispute as 
one concerning law enforcement activities when establishing the prima facie 
                                                                                                                      
67. Id. ¶ 77. 
68. Id. ¶ 90. 
69. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, Declaration of Judge Kittichaisaree, ¶ 4. 
70. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, Separate Opinion of Judge Gao, ¶ 50. 
71. Id. ¶ 33. 
72. Id. ¶ 51. 
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jurisdiction.73 If this approach is possible at the provisional measures stage 
of the proceedings, however, it is not suggested that it also applies to the 
subsequent arbitral proceedings themselves. At that point, the application of 
a preponderance test merits consideration. That test seeks to decide which 
element, military or law enforcement, is predominant. When applying the 
test, a threshold for evaluating predominant elements is of critical im-
portance. In that regard, Judge Gao pointedly observed, “A legally sound 
and viable approach to the issue in question should endeavour . . . to avoid 
introducing and applying either a very low or a very high threshold for the 
military activities exception.”74 
On the one hand, a very high threshold will significantly narrow the 
scope of Article 298(1)(b)’s military activities exception.75 On the other hand, 
a very low threshold may broaden the scope of the military activities excep-
tion and may unduly restrict the jurisdiction of adjudicatory bodies. Thus, as 
Judge Gao remarked, it is necessary to establish a reasonable threshold that 
avoids the two extremes. Such a threshold can be formulated only through 
further development of the jurisprudence on this issue. 
 
C. Interpreting the Military Activities Exception Summarized 
 
Three key points emerge for interpreting the military activities exception. 
First, according to ITLOS, neither the type of vessels nor the characteriza-
tion of the dispute by the parties provides a decisive criterion for distinguish-
                                                                                                                      
73. In this regard, Judge Lucky considered that “it could be both military and law en-
forcement, but in the light of the evidence before the Tribunal, it seems to me that the 
events of 25 November reveal a law enforcement exercise.” Detention of Three Ukrainian 
Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of May 25, 2019, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Lucky, ¶ 21. 
74. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, Separate Opinion of Judge Gao, ¶ 55. 
75. In this regard, Judge Gao expressed his misgivings that: 
A high threshold for the military activities exception may serve as an incentive for States to 
escalate rather than de-escalate a conflict by deploying a great numbers [sic] of naval vessels 
and increasing the level of forces in order to qualify for the military activities exception to 
compulsory dispute settlement jurisdiction. 
Id. ¶ 45. Similarly, Kraska noted his concern with the holding, arguing, “the military activities 
exemption has been significantly weakened” and concluding that this outcome will “thereby 
weaken trust in ITLOS.” James Kraska, Did ITLOS Just Kill the Military Activities Exemption 
in Article 298?, EJIL:TALK! (May 27, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/did-itlos-just-kill-the-
military-activities-exemption-in-article-298/. 
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ing military activities from law-enforcement activities. The distinction be-
tween the two must be made objectively, taking into account the relevant 
circumstances in each case. 
Second, when evaluating the nature of the activities in question in the 
Ukraine v. Russia case, ITLOS focused on the conduct of the parties, the 
cause of the dispute, and the context of the dispute. These three elements 
constitute the relevant circumstances for characterizing the dispute in ques-
tion. 
Third, a dispute may concern both military and law enforcement activi-
ties occurring at the same time. In the case of such mixed activities, the ap-
plication of a preponderance test merits consideration. When applying the 
test, there is a need to establish a reasonable threshold, avoiding one that is 
either extremely low or extremely high. 
 
III. IMMUNITY OF WARSHIPS 
 
A. Immunity of Warships, Naval Auxiliary Vessels, and Their Crew 
 
1. Plausibility of Claims by Ukraine 
 
In the Ukraine v. Russia case, an issue arose as to whether the detained vessels 
enjoyed immunity as warships under UNCLOS Articles 32 and 96. UN-
CLOS Article 29 defines warship as: 
 
[A] ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks 
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an of-
ficer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name 
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a 
crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.76 
 
Ukraine claimed that the Berdyansk and the Nikopol were warships within the 
meaning of Article 29 and that as a naval auxiliary vessel, the Yani Kapu, was 
entitled to immunity under Articles 32 and 96 of the Convention and general 
international law.77 
                                                                                                                      
76. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 29. 
77. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 92. 
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Notably, on this issue, ITLOS distinguished between the Berdyansk and 
the Nikopol and the Yani Kapu. ITLOS considered the Berdyansk and the Ni-
kopol to be “warships within the meaning of article 29 of the Convention.”78 
In contrast, it took the view that the Yani Kapu was “a ship owned or oper-
ated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service, as 
referred to in article 96 of the Convention.”79 While ITLOS did not refer to 
Article 32, a naval auxiliary would also fall within the scope of “government 
ships operated for non-commercial purposes” under this provision.80 Even-
tually, the Tribunal held that the rights claimed by Ukraine based on Articles 
32, 58, 95, and 96 of UNCLOS were plausible under the circumstances.81 
A related issue concerns the immunity of the Ukrainian crews. Ukraine 
maintained that the immunity provided for in UNCLOS protects the crews 
of warships and naval auxiliary vessels. In this regard, ITLOS noted that the 
twenty-four servicemen on board the vessels were military and security per-
sonnel. It thus held that the Ukrainian claim of their immunity was plausible.82 
However, the Tribunal immediately added that “the nature and scope of 
their immunity may require further scrutiny.”83 In so stating, ITLOS seemed 
to take a nuanced approach to the rights of the immunity of the Ukrainian 
servicemen. 
 
2. Standard of the Plausibility Test 
 
The issue here is the standard for deciding the plausibility of the claims of 
the parties to a dispute. Originally the plausibility test was introduced in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding provi-
sional measures.84 Subsequently, this test was first introduced in ITLOS ju-
risprudence in the Tribunal’s Order of April 25, 2015 regarding the maritime 
                                                                                                                      
78. Id. ¶ 97. 
79. Id. 
80. See also Richard Barnes, Article 32, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 250, 253. 
81. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 97. 
82. Id. ¶ 98. 
83. Id. 
84. The ICJ, in its order in the Belgium v. Senegal case, referred to the plausibility test 
in connection with the link between the right to be protected and the measures requested. 
See Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 
Provisional Measures, Order, 2009 I.C.J. Rep 139, ¶ 57 (May 28). Subsequently, in the 2011 
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case, the Court considered the plausibility requirement as a distinct 
requirement for indicating provisional measures. Certain Activities Carried Out by 
Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2011 
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boundary dispute between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. In that case, the ITLOS 
Special Chamber considered that it needed to satisfy itself that the rights 
Côte d’Ivoire claimed on the merits and sought to protect were at least plau-
sible.85 That same year ITLOS applied the plausibility test in the Enrica Lexie 
case.86 In both cases, one can find the influence of the ICJ jurisprudence on 
the development of ITLOS jurisprudence.87 
Still, the standard of the plausibility test is not well established in the 
jurisprudence of either the ICJ or ITLOS. In the April 25, 2015 Order, for 
instance, the ITLOS Special Chamber provided no precise criterion for de-
termining the plausibility of the alleged rights of Côte d’Ivoire.88 Likewise, 
ITLOS, in the Enrica Lexie order, found that “both Parties have sufficiently 
demonstrated that the rights they seek to protect regarding the Enrica Lexie 
incident are plausible,”89 without clarifying the standard the Tribunal applied. 
In the Ukraine v. Russia case, ITLOS remained mute on the standard. 
Similarly, the standard of the plausibility test remains controversial in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ.90 Accordingly, Judge Koroma gave his misgivings 
in this regard, stating: 
 
[T]he ambiguity or vagueness inherent in the English-language meaning of 
“plausible” makes it unreliable as a legal standard that parties must meet to 
obtain relief from this Court in the form of provisional measures, especially 
                                                                                                                      
I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 57 (Mar. 8); see also YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 193 (2018). 
85. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of Apr. 
25, 2015, Provisional Measures, ITLOS Rep. 146, 158, ¶ 58. The Special Chamber ruled that 
Côte d’Ivoire had presented enough material to show that the rights it seeks to protect in 
the disputed area are plausible. Id. at 159, ¶ 62. 
86. Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Order of Aug. 24, 2015, Provisional 
Measures, ITLOS Rep. 182, 197, ¶ 85. 
87. Yoshifumi Tanaka, The Impacts of the ITLOS Jurisprudence on the Development of Interna-
tional Law, in THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF 
THE SEA TO THE RULE OF LAW: 1996–2016, at 161, 170–71 (International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea ed., 2017). 
88. Yoshifumi Tanaka, Unilateral Exploration and Exploitation of Natural Resources in Dis-
puted Areas: A Note on the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order of 25 April 2015 before the Special Chamber 
of ITLOS, 46 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 315, 319 (2015). 
89. Enrica Lexie, supra note 86, ¶ 85. 
90. For an analysis of the plausibility test in the ICJ jurisprudence, see Massimo Lando, 
Plausibility in the Provisional Measures Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, 31 LEIDEN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 641 (2018); CAMERON MILES, PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 194–201 (2017). 
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since the binding force of orders indicating provisional measures has been 
confirmed by the Court. The standard may even inadvertently offer parties 
an opportunity to submit specious claims which, at a superficial glance, may 
appear credible but could mislead the Court to indicate provisional 
measures.91 
 
The standard for the plausibility test can significantly influence the pre-
scription of provisional measures in a particular case. An illustrative example 
is the 2017 Order of the ICJ in a case brought by Ukraine against Russia for 
interference in Ukrainian affairs.92 In this case, the ICJ, for the first time in 
its jurisprudence, declined the request for the indication of provisional 
measures because of the absence of plausibility.93 Yet the Court’s view was 
challenged by Judge Owada who emphasized that “the standard of plausibil-
ity is, and must be, fairly low.”94 
Furthermore, the level of the standard is linked to the distinction be-
tween provisional measures and an interim judgment. As the Permanent 
Court of International Justice stated in Factory at Chorzów, 
 
Considering that the request of the German Government cannot be re-
garded as relating to the indication of measures of interim protection, but 
as designed to obtain an interim judgment in favour of a part of the claim 
formulated in the Application above mentioned; That, consequently, the 
request under consideration is not covered by the terms of the provisions 
of the Statute and Rules cited therein.95 
 
Nonetheless, the examination of the plausibility of the alleged rights at the 
stage of provisional measures may risk dealing with matters that should be 
examined on the merits and, consequently, the order of provisional measures 
may effectively constitute an interim judgment. In this connection, Judge 
Sepúlveda-Amor expressed his concern: 
 
                                                                                                                      
91. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 29, ¶ 8 (Mar. 8) (separate opinion 
by Koroma, J.). 
92. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2017 I.C.J. Rep. 104 (Apr. 19). 
93. Id. ¶¶ 75–76. 
94. Id. ¶ 20; see also id. ¶ 16. 
95. Factory at Chorzów (Indemnities) (Ger. v. Pol.), Order, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
12, at 10 (Nov. 21). 
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[T]he imprecision surrounding the ‘plausibility requirement’ and the un-
warranted emphasis placed upon that in this Order might ultimately en-
courage States seeking interim protection to over-address the substance of 
the dispute at an early stage and, as a result, overburden proceedings under 
Article 41 of the Statute with matters that should actually be dealt with by 
the Court when adjudicating on the merits.96 
 
Similarly, Judge Owada expressed his misgivings, stating, “If . . . this standard 
were too high, a determination on whether the right is plausible could risk 
resulting in a prejudgment of the merits of the dispute.”97 A high standard 
for the plausibility test may risk making the distinction between provisional 
measures and prejudgment less clear. Hence, there may be room for the view 
that the standard for the plausibility test should be relatively low. 
 
B. The Applicability of UNCLOS Article 32 to Internal Waters 
 
1. Negative View 
 
Another issue relating to the immunity of warships is the applicability of 
UNCLOS Article 32 to internal waters.98 This was a matter of extensive de-
bate in the ARA Libertad case. Although it was beyond doubt that the frigate 
Libertad was a warship of the Argentine Navy,99 Argentina contended that its 
detention violated the rights recognized by UNCLOS.100 More specifically, 
the dispute between Argentina and Ghana turned on the interpretation and 
application of UNCLOS Articles 18(1)(b), 32, 87(1)(a), and 90.101 Among 
those provisions, Argentina contended that Article 32 confirmed the well-
established rule of general international law according warships a special and 
                                                                                                                      
96. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 35, ¶ 15 (Mar. 8) (separate opinion 
by Sepúlveda-Amor, J.). 
97. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2017 I.C.J. Rep. 104, 142, ¶ 10 
(Apr. 19) (separate opinion by Owada, J.); see also TAKANE SUGIHARA, KOKUSAI SHIHO 
SAIBAN SEIDO [INSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE] 285 (1996) [JAP-
ANESE]. 
98. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 32. On this issue, see Tanaka, supra note 1, at 384–85. 
99. Request for Provisional Measures Submitted by Argentina, supra note 3, ¶ 3. 
100. Id. ¶ 23. 
101. Id.; ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Verbatim Record, IT-
LOS/PV.12/C20/1, at 21 (Nov. 29, 2012); ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 341, ¶ 39. 
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autonomous type of immunity that provides for the complete immunity of 
these ships.102 It also contended that Article 32 determines the immunity of 
warships “with respect to the entire geographical scope of the Convention” 
and that the “immunity accorded to warship is identical in internal waters as 
it is in the territorial sea.”103 However, Ghana countered that since there was 
no dispute between Ghana and Argentina on the interpretation or applica-
tion of UNCLOS, ITLOS had no jurisdiction to order the provisional 
measures requested by Argentina.104 Ghana also contended that the Annex 
VII arbitral tribunal had no prima facie jurisdiction in this case since none 
of those provisions—Articles 18(1)(b), 32, 87(1)(a), and 90—applied to acts 
occurring in internal waters.105 
On this issue, Judges Wolfrum and Cot took the view that prima facie 
Article 32 was meant to apply only in the territorial sea since it is placed in 
the section on innocent passage in the territorial sea.106 In their view, the 
immunity of warships relies on customary international law, not on UN-
CLOS,107 and Article 32 did not indicate that it incorporated customary in-
ternational law into UNCLOS.108 Accordingly, Judges Wolfrum and Cot 
concluded, “there are valid considerations which would preclude the Tribu-
nal from deciding that prima facie the arbitral tribunal under Annex VII would 
have jurisdiction.”109 
 
                                                                                                                      
102. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 341, ¶ 44. 
103. Id. at 342, ¶ 46; see also id. at 342, ¶ 50; ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 
20, Verbatim Record, ITLOS/PV.12/C20/3, at 3–5 (Nov. 30, 2012). 
104. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 342, ¶ 51; ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 
20, Verbatim Record ITLOS/PV.12/C20/2, at 5 (Nov. 29, 2012); ARA Libertad (Arg. v. 
Ghana), Case No. 20, Verbatim Record ITLOS/PV.12/C20/4, at 11 (Nov. 30, 2012). 
105. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 342, ¶ 52; ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 
20, Verbatim Record ITLOS/PV.12/C20/2, at 13 (Nov. 29, 2012); id. at 18. 
106. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 
15, 2012,  ITLOS Rep. 332, 363, ¶ 45 (separate opinion by Wolfrum, J. and Cot, J.). 
107. Id. at 373, ¶ 43. 
108. Id. at 376, ¶ 50. 
109. Id. at 376, ¶ 51. Even so, Judge Wolfrum and Judge Cot eventually accepted that 
the prima facie jurisdiction of the Tribunal for Ghana was estopped from presenting any 
objection on the provisional measures filed by Argentina. Id. at 381, ¶ 69. However, Judge 
Rao concluded that the doctrine of estoppel may not have a bearing on the prima facie 
jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal in this case. See ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), 
Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 15, 2012,  ITLOS Rep. 332, 357, ¶¶ 12–
14 (separate opinion by Rao, J.). 
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2. Positive View 
 
The ITLOS majority took a different view, noting that Article 32 provides 
that “nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships,” with-
out specifying the geographical scope of its application.110 According to the 
Tribunal, 
 
although article 32 is included in Part II of the Convention entitled “Terri-
torial Sea and Contiguous Zone”, and most of the provisions in this Part 
relate to the territorial sea, some of the provisions in this Part may be ap-
plicable to all maritime areas, as in the case of the definition of warships 
provided for in article 29 of the Convention.111 
 
Arguably, the dictum can be interpreted to imply that Article 32 applies to 
internal waters.112 The Tribunal, in its December 15 Order, limited itself by 
observing only that a difference of opinions existed between the parties as 
to the applicability of Article 32 and that a dispute appeared to exist between 
the parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.113 
Accordingly, it found that Article 32 afforded a basis on which prima facie 
jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal might be founded.114 While 
this issue should have been decided at the merits stage of the case, the out-
of-court settlement terminated the arbitral proceedings. Thus, the applica-
bility of Article 32 to internal waters was not decided. 
It is beyond question that in international law, a warship enjoys immunity 
in internal waters. In the ARA Libertad case, ITLOS stated, “in accordance 
with general international law, a warship enjoys immunity, including in internal 
waters, and that this is not disputed by Ghana.”115 The dictum of the Tribunal 
was echoed by Judge Paik, stating: “[A]mong the rights at issue is that of 
                                                                                                                      
110. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 344, ¶ 63. 
111. Id. at 344, ¶ 64. 
112. In this regard, Judge Lucky, clearly stated: 
[I]nternational law and the relevant articles in the Convention should be considered as a 
whole and in these circumstances article 32 can be deemed to include internal waters; not 
only because it does not explicitly exclude the immunity of warships in internal waters, but 
because it should be read in congruence with other rules of international law which guaran-
tee such immunity. 
ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 15, 2012,  
ITLOS Rep. 332, 382, ¶ 38 (separate opinion by Lucky, J.). 
113. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 344, ¶ 65. 
114. Id. at 344, ¶ 66. 
115. Id. at 348, ¶ 95 (emphasis added). 
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Argentina to enjoy the immunity of a warship in the port of a foreign State. 
This right is clearly established in international law, and, in fact, constitutes 
one of the most important pillars of the ordre public of the oceans.”116 Article 
32 makes clear that nothing in UNCLOS affects the immunities of warships 
and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. In light 
of this, the application of Article 32 to internal waters resolves any issue 
concerning the inconsistency between the treaty provision’s language and a 
rule of customary international law. 
 
C. Immunity of Warships Summarized 
 
The above considerations can be summarized in three points. First, ITLOS 
regarded a naval auxiliary, the Yani Kapu, as a vessel used only on government 
non-commercial service. It follows then that vessels ancillary to warships fall 
within the scope of UNCLOS Articles 32 and 96. 
Second, the plausibility of rights asserted by the applicant State is a re-
quirement for ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures. Nonetheless, the 
standard of the plausibility test is not well established in the jurisprudence of 
ITLOS. Given that a high standard may blur the distinction between provi-
sional measures and an interim judgment, the better view is that the standard 
for the plausibility test should be relatively low. 
Third, in the ARA Libertad case, opinions of the members of ITLOS 
were divided regarding the applicability of Article 32 to internal waters. In 
light of the phrase “nothing in this Convention,” however, there is scope to 
consider that Article 32 may also apply to other marine spaces, including 
internal waters.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
116. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 
15, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 332, 352, ¶ 2 (declaration by Paik, J.). 
117. Barnes echoes this interpretation. See Barnes, supra note 80, at 252. 
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IV. THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION 
 
A. The Urgency of the Situation Regarding the Release of a Detained Warship and Its 
Crew 
 
1. The ARA Libertad Case 
 
As noted, urgency is a prerequisite for an international court or tribunal to 
prescribe provisional measures.118 UNCLOS Article 290(5) clarifies this re-
quirement, providing that “the urgency of the situation so requires.”119 Arti-
cle 89(4) of the ITLOS Rules also requires that a request for the prescription 
of provisional measures must indicate ‘the urgency of the situation.”120 The 
issue at point is whether the release of a detained foreign warship and its 
crew can be regarded as a matter of urgency. 
In the ARA Libertad case, Ghana maintained that “there is no real or 
imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Argentina’s rights caused by the 
ongoing docking of the vessel”121 and that “there is no urgency such as to 
justify the imposition of the measures requested, in the period pending the 
constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.”122 However, Argentina 
maintained that Ghana’s action was producing irreparable damage to the im-
munity that the Libertad enjoys, the exercise of its right to leave the territorial 
waters of Ghana, and its freedom of navigation.123 It also claimed, “[f]urther 
attempts to forcibly board and move the Frigate without the consent of Ar-
gentina would lead to the escalation of the conflict and to serious incidents 
in which human lives would be at risk.”124 In its order, ITLOS accepted that 
“the urgency of the situation requires the prescription by the Tribunal of 
provisional measures that will ensure full compliance with the applicable 
                                                                                                                      
118. For an analysis of the requirement of urgency in ITLOS jurisprudence, see Yo-
shifumi Tanaka, The Requirement of Urgency in the Jurisprudence of ITLOS Concerning Provisional 
Measures, in INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 107 (Angela Del Vecchio & Rob-
erto Virzo eds., 2019). 
119. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 290(5). 
120. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Rules of the Tribunal, 2009 IT-
LOS/8, at 33 (Sept. 25, 2018). 
121. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 346, ¶ 79. 
122. Id. at 347, ¶ 88. 
123. Id. at 345, ¶ 75. 
124. Request for Provisional Measures Submitted by Argentina, supra note 3, ¶ 60; ARA 
Libertad, supra note 1, at 347, ¶ 82. 
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rules of international law, thus preserving the respective rights of the Par-
ties.”125 
Here, a key issue is the standard for deciding the existence of the urgency 
of the situation. In the ICJ jurisprudence, there is a clear trend indicating that 
the Court examines the risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency at the same 
time.126 While ITLOS jurisprudence is not consistent on this issue,127 in some 
cases, the Tribunal linked the urgency requirement to irreparable prejudice. 
For instance, in the 2002 MOX Plant case, ITLOS ruled that provisional 
measures may be prescribed “if the Tribunal considers that the urgency of 
the situation so requires in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of 
either party or causing serious harm to the marine environment is likely to 
be taken before the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.”128 In its 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, the ITLOS Special Chamber made this point 
clearly, stating, “urgency is required in order to exercise the power to pre-
scribe provisional measures, that is to say the need to avert a real and immi-
nent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to rights at issue before 
the final decision is delivered.”129 The same standard was applied in the 2019 
M/T San Padre Pio case.130 Under this standard, the temporal element (ur-
gency) is incorporated into the concept of a “real and imminent risk.” 
The application of this standard depends on how the conduct of the 
respondent State affected the rights of the applicant State. In this regard, in 
the ARA Libertad case, ITLOS concluded, “actions taken by the Ghanaian 
authorities that prevent the ARA Libertad . . . from discharging its mission 
                                                                                                                      
125. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 349, ¶ 100. 
126. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Article 41, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1026, 1047 (Andreas Zimmerman, Christian Tomuschat, 
Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christian Tams eds., 2d. 2012); SUGIHARA, supra note 97, at 280; 
TANAKA, supra note 84, at 196. 
127. Tanaka, supra note 118, at 109–14. 
128. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 3, 
2001, ITLOS Rep. 95, 108, ¶ 64. 
129. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of Apr. 
25, 2015, Provisional Measures, ITLOS Rep. 146, 156, ¶ 42. 
130. M/T San Padre Pio (Switz. v. Nigeria), Case No. 27, Provisional Measures, Order 
of July 6, 2019,  ITLOS Rep., ¶ 111. Please note that the analysis in this article relies on the 
electronic version of the Tribunal’s Order of July 6, 2019, available at the ITLOS website. 
See INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, CASE NO. 27, https://www.it-
los.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-27/. 
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and duties affect the immunity enjoyed by this warship under general inter-
national law.”131  The Tribunal expressed its concern as such: 
 
[A]ttempts by the Ghanaian authorities on 7 November 2012 to board the 
warship ARA Libertad and to move it by force to another berth without 
authorization by its Commander and the possibility that such actions may 
be repeated, demonstrate the gravity of the situation and underline the ur-
gent need for measures pending the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal.132 
 
This statement contains temporal elements relating to the past, present, and 
future: the attempted boarding by Ghanaian authorities on November 7 (the 
past), and the possibility of this could be repeated (the present and future). 
The temporal elements were clarified by Judge Paik, stating, “In the present 
case, the alleged violation of Argentina’s rights has already occurred and the 
state of infraction continues. Moreover, further violations are likely to oc-
cur . . . .”133 As will be discussed below, the temporal elements are crucial to 
identifying the urgency of the situation. 
 
2. The Ukraine v. Russia Case 
 
In the Ukraine v. Russia case, ITLOS examined the existence of the urgency 
of the situation in the context of irreparable prejudice, concluding: 
 
Pursuant to article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention, the Tribunal may 
prescribe provisional measures if the urgency of the situation so requires. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal may not prescribe such measures unless it con-
siders that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may 
be caused to the rights of parties to the dispute before the constitution and 
functioning of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.134 
 
Accordingly, the Tribunal assessed whether there was a real and imminent 
risk creating irreparable prejudice to the rights of the parties.135 
                                                                                                                      
131. ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 349, ¶ 98. 
132. Id. at 349, ¶ 99. 
133. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 
15, 2012,  ITLOS Rep. 332, 352, ¶ 6 (declaration by Paik, J.) (emphasis added). 
134. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 100. 
135. Id. In this regard, the Russian Federation claimed that there was no urgency. Rus-
sian Memorandum, supra note 15, at 16–17, ¶¶ 38–40. 
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Referencing the dictum of the ARA Libertad order,136 ITLOS took the 
view that “any action affecting the immunity of warships is capable of caus-
ing serious harm to the dignity and sovereignty of a State and has the poten-
tial to undermine its national security.”137 According to the Tribunal, the 
Russian actions could irreparably prejudice Ukraine’s rights regarding the 
immunity of its naval vessels and their servicemen if the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal adjudged those rights to belong to Ukraine, and that “the risk of 
irreparable prejudice was real and ongoing.”138 Moreover, ITLOS held “the 
continued deprivation of liberty and freedom of Ukraine’s servicemen raises 
humanitarian concerns.”139 It thus accepted the existence of a real and immi-
nent risk of irreparable prejudice to Ukraine’s rights.140 
In that determination, one can identify the three temporal elements. 
First, the alleged violation of Ukraine’s rights had already occurred (the past). 
Second, the risk of irreparable prejudice was “ongoing” (the present). Third, 
the expression “the continued deprivation of liberty and freedom of Ukraine’s 
servicemen” show the risk may continue (the future). From this finding, it 
can be concluded that interlinked temporal elements constitute the key fac-
tors when identifying the existence of a real and imminent risk that may cause 
irreparable prejudice to rights at issue. 
 
B. Discussion 
 
1. Timeframe for Deciding the Urgency of the Situation 
 
When considering the urgency of the situation, the timeframe set out in par-
agraphs 1 and 5 of UNCLOS Article 290 must be examined. In this regard, 
two different interpretations exist.141 
Under a restrictive interpretation of Article 290(5), ITLOS is to deter-
mine whether the urgency of the situation requires provisional measures 
“pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.” It follows that the require-
ment of urgency under paragraph 5 is stricter than the same requirement in 
                                                                                                                      
136. ITLOS, in the ARA Libertad case, stated, “a warship is an expression of the sov-
ereignty of the State whose flag it flies.” ARA Libertad, supra note 1, at 348, ¶ 94. 
137. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 110. 
138. Id. ¶ 111. 
139. Id. ¶ 112. 
140. Id. ¶ 113. 
141. Tanaka, supra note 118, at 120–21. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
paragraph 1,142 an interpretation supported by some ITLOS members. For 
example, according to Judge Heider, in the case of provisional measures un-
der Article 290(1), these measures are to apply pending the final decision.143 
Under Article 290(5), however, any provisional measures shall apply only 
pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is to be 
submitted. Hence, Judge Heider indicates the temporal dimension of the re-
quirement of urgency is much more stringent under paragraph 5 than under 
paragraph 1.144 Judge Paik145 and Judge Rao146 echoed this view. 
Under a broad interpretation of Article 290(5), the assessment of the 
urgency of the situation is not confined to the period before the constitution 
of an arbitral tribunal. This interpretation appears to be supported by ITLOS 
itself. In the Land Reclamation case, the Tribunal stated, “there is nothing in 
article 290 of the Convention to suggest that the measures prescribed by the 
Tribunal must be confined to that period.”147 Further the Tribunal con-
cluded: 
 
[T]he said period is not necessarily determinative for the assessment of the 
urgency of the situation or the period during which the prescribed 
measures are applicable and that the urgency of the situation must be as-
sessed taking into account the period during which the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal is not yet in a position to “modify, revoke or affirm those provi-
sional measures.148 
 
                                                                                                                      
142. The court or tribunal may prescribe provisional measures “to preserve the respec-
tive rights of the parties . . . or to prevent serious injury to the marine environment pending 
the final decision.” UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 290(1). 
143. Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Order of Aug. 24, 2015, Provisional 
Measures, ITLOS Rep. 182, 287, ¶¶ 6–7, 12 (dissenting opinion by Heider, J.). 
144. Id. 
145. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Provisional Measures, Order of Dec. 
15, 2012,  ITLOS Rep. 332, 352, ¶ 3 (declaration by Paik, J.). 
146. Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Order of Aug. 24, 2015, Provisional 
Measures, ITLOS Rep. 182, 240, ¶ 6 (dissenting opinion by Rao, J.). According to a study, 
in the cases submitted under Article 290(1) the whole procedure took up to a maximum of 
fifty-seven days. In contrast, the cases submitted under Article 290(5) were dealt with by 
ITLOS between twenty-five and thirty-four days. See P. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO & 
PHILIPPE GAUTIER, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 228 (2018). 
147. Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), 
Case No. 12, Provisional Measures, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 67. 
148. Id. ¶ 68. 
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ITLOS confirmed this view in the Arctic Sunrise order, stating, “there is 
nothing in article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention to suggest that the 
measures prescribed by the Tribunal must be confined to the period prior to 
the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.”149 
But, in the Ukraine v. Russia case, the Tribunal referred to the Enrica Lexie 
case,150 and held, “the Tribunal may not prescribe such measures unless it 
considers that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may 
be caused to the rights of parties to the dispute before the constitution and func-
tioning of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal . . . .”151 The Tribunal also found, 
“there is a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of 
Ukraine pending the constitution and functioning of the Annex VII arbitral tri-
bunal.”152 
While the language of the two statements seems inconsistent, the expres-
sion “pending the constitution and functioning of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal” can be interpreted to mean that a real and imminent risk of irrepa-
rable prejudice to the rights of Ukraine exists during the period that the An-
nex VII arbitral tribunal is functioning. If this is the case, it seems that the 
timeframe under Article 290(5) is not limited to the period that an arbitral 
tribunal is being constituted.153 According to the broad interpretation, the 
difference between the timeframes of paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 290 is 
narrow. 
 
2. Humanitarian Considerations and the Urgency of the Situation 
 
Finally, attention must be given to the implications of humanitarian consid-
erations or concerns for the prescription of provisional measures.154 In the 
Ukraine v. Russia case, Ukraine highlighted the urgent need for provisional 
                                                                                                                      
149. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 
23, 2013, ITLOS Rep. 230, ¶ 84. 
150. Enrica Lexie, supra note 86, at 197, ¶ 87. 
151. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 100 (emphasis added). 
152. Id. ¶ 113 (emphasis added). 
153. In the M/T San Padre Pio case, ITLOS considered the existence of the urgency of 
the situation “pending the constitution and functioning of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.” 
M/T San Padre Pio, supra note 130, ¶ 131. 
154. For the concept of considerations of humanity in ITLOS jurisprudence, see Fran-
cesca Delfino, ‘Considerations of Humanity’ in the Jurisprudence of ITLOS and UNCLOS Arbitral 
Tribunals, in INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 118, at 421. 
In the present article, the terms “humanitarian considerations,” “humanitarian con-
cerns,” and “considerations of humanity” are used interchangeably. 
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measures in light of “practical and humanitarian considerations.”155 As noted 
above, ITLOS also expressed “humanitarian concerns” about “the contin-
ued deprivation of liberty and freedom of Ukraine’s servicemen.”156 As the 
Tribunal stated, “[c]onsiderations of humanity must apply in the law of the 
sea, as they do in other areas of international law.”157 However, an issue that 
needs further examination is whether “humanitarian concerns” should be 
regarded as a distinct element requiring the prescription of provisional 
measures.158 
The implications of humanitarian considerations for the prescription of 
provisional measures remain unclear in ITLOS jurisprudence. For example, 
in the Arctic Sunrise case, ITLOS prescribed a provisional measure ordering 
the Russian Federation to “immediately release the vessel Arctic Sunrise and 
all persons who have been detained, upon the posting of a bond or other 
financial security.”159 However, in this order, ITLOS did not refer to human-
itarian considerations. In the Enrica Lexie case, Italy requested ITLOS pre-
scribe a provisional measure ordering that India’s restrictions on the liberty, 
security, and movement of the two Italian marines concerned be immediately 
lifted to enable them to remain in Italy throughout the duration of the pro-
ceedings before the Annex VII Tribunal.160 Italy stressed that the urgency 
was “both humanitarian and legal.”161 However, ITLOS did not prescribe 
the provisional measures requested by Italy, nor did it refer to humanitarian 
considerations or concern.162 In contrast, in the M/T San Padre Pio case, IT-
LOS considered that “the threat to the safety and security of the Master and 
the three officers of the M/T ‘San Padre Pio’, and the restrictions on their 
                                                                                                                      
155. Ukraine v. Russia Order, supra note 2, ¶ 105. 
156. Id. ¶ 112. 
157. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, 
ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 155. This view was confirmed by the Tribunal in the Enrica Lexie case. 
See Enrica Lexie, supra note 86, at 204, ¶ 133. 
158. On this issue, see Yoshifumi Tanaka, Dual Provisional Measures Prescribed by the IT-
LOS and Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal: Reflections on the ‘Enrica Lexie’ Incident Case, in THE 
GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 2017, at 
265, 279–84 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 2018). 
159. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 
23, 2013, ITLOS Rep. 230, ¶ 105(1)(a). 
160. Enrica Lexie, supra note 86, at 189, ¶ 29(b). 
161. Id. at 199, ¶ 99. 
162. However, Judge Jesus referred to the considerations of humanity. See Enrica Lexie 
(It. v. India), Case No. 24, Order of Aug. 24, 2015, Provisional Measures, ITLOS Rep. 182, 
226, ¶ 11 (separate opinion by Jesus, J.). 
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liberty and freedom for a lengthy period, raise humanitarian concerns.”163 
Yet the Tribunal provided no further precision with regard to the concept 
of humanitarian concerns. 
The Enrica Lexie Incident arbitration stands out as an exceptional case on 
this matter.164 When prescribing provisional measures, the arbitral tribunal 
gave particular weight to considerations of humanity. In fact, in its April 29, 
2016 order, it clearly stated that “its decision should seek to give effect to 
the concept of considerations of humanity, while preserving the respective 
rights of the Parties.”165 It thus prescribed a provisional measure ordering 
Italy and India to cooperate to “achieve a relaxation of the bail conditions of 
Sergeant Girone so as to give effect to the concept of considerations of hu-
manity, so that Sergeant Girone . . . may return to Italy during the present 
Annex VII arbitration.”166 As discussed elsewhere, the arbitral tribunal’s ap-
proach was contested.167 
The normative content of the concept of humanitarian considerations 
remains vague.168 Due to this vagueness, it is open to debate whether hu-
manitarian considerations provide an independent legal basis for prescribing 
provisional measures. There is nothing in the jurisprudence of ITLOS indi-
cating humanitarian considerations are a separate basis for the prescription 
of provisional measures, and here, the statement of the ICJ in its 1966 South 
West Africa judgment warrants consideration: 
 
Throughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly, that hu-
manitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to generate legal 
rights and obligations, and that the Court can and should proceed accord-
ingly. The Court does not think so. It is a court of law, and can take account 
of moral principles only in so far as these are given a sufficient expression 
in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for 
that reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own dis-
cipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be rendered.169 
 
                                                                                                                      
163. M/T San Padre Pio, supra note 130, ¶ 130. 
164. Enrica Lexie Incident (It. v. India), Case No. 2015-28, PCA Case Repository, Pro-
visional Measures, Order of Apr. 29, 2016 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
165. Id. ¶ 106. 
166. Id. ¶ 132(a); see also id. ¶ 124. 
167. See Tanaka, supra note 158, at 281–84. 
168. Id. at 283. 
169. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 
I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 49 (July 18). 
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Further, the ICJ concluded, “Humanitarian considerations may constitute 
the inspirational basis for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular 
parts of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political basis 
for the specific legal provisions thereafter set out. Such considerations do 
not, however, in themselves amount to rules of law.”170 Based on those state-
ments, the concept of humanitarian considerations arguably should be re-
garded as an element that should be taken into account in the interpretation 
of the urgency of the situation or a real and imminent risk that irreparable 
prejudice may be caused to the rights of parties to the dispute, but not as an 
independent legal rule.171 
 
C. Urgency, Timeframe, and Humanitarian Concerns Summarized 
 
In the ARA Libertad and Ukraine v. Russia cases, ITLOS examined whether 
there was a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused 
to the rights at issue. According to this approach, the temporal element (ur-
gency) is incorporated into the concept of a real and imminent risk. 
Second, ITLOS members are divided about the impact of the textual 
differences of paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 290(1) concerning the timeframe 
for ordering provisional measures. In the Ukraine v. Russia case, the Tribunal 
seemed to take a broad interpretation that narrowed the differences. 
Third, in the Ukraine v. Russia case, ITLOS expressed humanitarian con-
cerns about the continued deprivation of liberty and freedom of the Ukrain-
ian servicemen. Yet the implications of humanitarian concerns for the pre-
scription of provisional measures remains uncertain. In light of the modest 
normativity that the concept of humanitarian concerns or humanitarian con-
siderations evinces, this concept can be regarded as an element of the inter-
pretation of the urgency of the situation or a real and imminent risk, but not 
as an independent legal rule. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article examined the release of a detained foreign warship and its crew 
through ITLOS’s ordering of provisional measures by analyzing the ARA 
Libertad and Ukraine v. Russia cases. These two cases shed light on three 
murky issues regarding the interpretation or application of relevant provi-
sions of UNCLOS, even though they do not completely resolve these issues. 
                                                                                                                      
170. Id. ¶ 50. 
171. Tanaka, supra note 158, at 284. 
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First, the Ukraine v. Russia case highlighted the importance of the inter-
pretation of military activities provided in UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b). Ac-
cording to ITLOS, the question of whether a dispute concerns military ac-
tivities is to be decided after taking account of various relevant circum-
stances, including the type of vessels, the characterization of a dispute by the 
parties, the conduct of the parties, and the cause and context of the dispute. 
This approach has merits since it enables the Tribunal the flexibility to 
decide the nature of a dispute on a case-by-case basis. In practice, however, 
as was the situation in the dispute between Ukraine and Russia, the distinc-
tion between military and law enforcement activities may not be clear-cut 
since elements of both activities may be present. When there are mixed mil-
itary and law enforcement activities, a threshold for deciding the preponder-
ance of military or law enforcement elements is of critical importance. A very 
high threshold for invocation of the military activities exception entails the 
risk of significantly reducing the scope of the exception. By contrast, a very 
low threshold may enlarge the scope of the military activities exception, 
thereby restricting the jurisdiction of adjudicatory bodies under the Conven-
tion. Thus, there is a need to establish a reasonable standard, avoiding an 
extremely low or high threshold. Further accumulation of case law will be 
needed to formulate this threshold. 
Second, the Ukraine v. Russia case resolved the question of whether ves-
sels ancillary to warships can be considered “ships owned or operated by a 
State and used only on government non-commercial service” referred to in 
UNCLOS Article 96. Such vessels also fall within the scope of or “govern-
ment ships operated for non-commercial purposes” under Article 32 of the 
Convention. In the ARA Libertad case, ITLOS members were divided on 
the applicability of Article 32 to internal waters. However, even if in the fu-
ture it were to be determined that Article 32 is inapplicable, it will not affect 
the immunities of warships in customary international law. 
Third, a temporal element, urgency, is an essential requirement to pre-
scribe provisional measures. According to ITLOS’s approach in both the 
ARA Libertad and Ukraine v. Russia cases, the requirement of urgency is in-
corporated into the concept of a real and imminent risk that irreparable prej-
udice may be caused to rights at issue. When identifying the existence of a 
real and imminent risk, it is necessary to examine three temporal elements: 
the alleged breach of the rights of the applicant State that has already oc-
curred (the past), the existence of ongoing risk (the present), and the possi-
bility of repetition or continuity of the risk (the future). As urgency is a time-
sensitive element, it is logical that temporal elements must be examined when 
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considering the existence of a real and imminent risk. Here one can find the 
implication of temporal elements for the prescription of provisional 
measures. While the passage of time can affect the interpretation and appli-
cation of many rules of international law, the consideration of time sensitive 
elements is particularly important in the jurisprudence concerning provi-
sional measures. 
 
